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PROTECTING THE PRESS FROM STANFORD DAILY: A
FEDERAL NEWSMAN'S WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
FROM SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In May 1978, the Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily' dealt a
major blow to newsmen seeking recognition of special protections under
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.' In upholding the
seizure of photographs from the files of a newspaper office, the Court
determined that no more than an application of the fourth amendment's
probable cause requirement 3 with "particular exactitude" is necessary
1 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In Stanford Daily, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time
the issue of special protection for newsmen under the first amendment to the United States
Constitution when presented with a good faith request for documentary evidence. Cf. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Supreme Court first faces and denies claim for newsman's
testimonial privilege under first amendment). For a discussion of Branzburg, see text accom-
panying notes 21-31 infra. The district court opinion in Stanford Daily, Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436
U.S. 547 (1978), held that a subpoena duces tecum should be used in place of a search warrant
in all but rare circumstances. 353 F. Supp. at 130; see text accompanying notes 40-51 infra.
This lower court opinion had received considerable praise from several sources maintaining
that newsmen are entitled to special protection because of the first amendment interests
involved. See, e.g., State v. Klinker, 85 Wash.2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975); Note, Search and
Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Search and Seizure of the Media]; Comment,
The Theory of Probable Cause and Searches of Innocent Persons: The Fourth Amendment
and Stanford Daily, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1445 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Theory of Probable
Cause]. But see United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); State v. Tunnel
Citgo Serv. & Deluxe Oil Co., 149 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 374 A.2d 32, 35 (1977).
2 The first amendment states in part, "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom . . . of the press. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The first amendment is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
Newsmen argued in Stanford Daily that this language gave them greater protection from
search and seizure than that afforded under the fourth amendment. 436 U.S. at 563; see note
3 infra.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and.the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A leading case interpreting the
fourth amendment is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), in which the Supreme Court
rejected the "mere evidence" rule which had limited searches and seizures to items of contra-
band, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or weapons with which a criminal could escape.
Id. at 306-07. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court redefined
the scope of the fourth amendment's protections, concluding that the object of the amend-
ment's protection is people, not areas of property. Id. at 353. According to the Katz Court,
fourth amendment protection is afforded where there is a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy," coining a phrase from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The reasonable expectation of privacy benchmark has been ridiculed on the basis
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where first amendment interests would be endangered by a search.'
Stanford Daily is in accord with Branzburg v. Hayes,5 decided six years
earlier, in which the Supreme Court denied the existence of a testimonial
privilege under the first amendment for newsmen subpoenaed in good faith
by a grand jury.' The Branzburg decision marked the beginning of the
current flurry of activity concerning the establishment of a newsman's
privilege.7 Newsmen heeded the advice of the Branzburg Court to look to
the legislatures for a newsman's privilege' and were successful in substan-
tially increasing the list of states with newsman shield laws.9 Efforts to
that if this formula constitutes the trigger to fourth amendment protections, the government
need only make periodic announcements identifying areas where no privacy exists. Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Amsterdam]. Since the Framers of the Constitution certainly desired more protec-
tion than these governmental announcements would provide, Katz cannot be rationally inter-
preted as all-inclusive, but merely as identifying one area of fourth amendment protection.
Id. at 385.
1 436 U.S. at 565.
5 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
1 Id. at 690, 708. The Supreme Court noted that the only testimonial privilege rooted in
the Constitution is the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id.
at 689-90.
' See Eckhardt & McKey, Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co.: Substantive and Remedial
Aspects of First Amendment Protection for a Reporter's Confidential Sources, 14 IDAHO L.
Rxv. 21, 62 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eckhardt & McKey]. Prior to the Branzburg decision,
regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Justice also served to attract
attention to the plight of the newsman as he attempted to preserve his confidential sources
of information. The Branzburg Court cited the Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media,
announced by then Attorney General John Mitchell on August 10, 1970, as a possible solution
to the overburdening of newsmen with subpoenas. 408 U.S. at 707; see text accompanying
notes 18, & 19 infra. The guidelines, currently codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1978), call for
federal employees to use alternative means from subpoenas if possible to obtain information
from the news media, negotiations with the media, and as a last resort, issuance of a subpoena
under a balancing test "between the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and
information and the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration
of justice." Id.; see Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 960 n.20; Eckhardt &
McKey, supra, at 62, 62 n.265. Under these regulations, a subpoena may issue only after a
breakdown in negotiations with the press and under the express authorization of the Attorney
General. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(d) (1978). Administrative reprimand or other "appropriate" disci-
plinary action may be imposed if the subpoena is issued absent the prior approval of the
Attorney General. Id. § 50.10(k). Failure to adhere to Justice Department guidelines, how-
ever, has been held no defense to a subpoena. See In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1972);
cf. In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133, 137 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Lewis v. United States,
517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (government has no burden to show its adherence to the guide-
lines).
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court explicitly advised the newsmen to capitalize on the
power of Congress and state legislatures to construct a newsman's privilege. 408 U.S. at 706.
Additionally, the Stanford Daily Court noted the power of legislatures to "establish noncon-
stitutional protections" for newsmen. 436 U.S. at 567.
1 Twenty-six states have enacted newsman shield laws. Note, The Newsman's Privilege
After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160, 167 n.41 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg]; see note 32 infra. The Stanford
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secure the passage of federal legislation, however, have proven unsuccess-
ful. 10 Nevertheless, in response to the Stanford Daily decision, the execu-
tive branch has introduced a comprehensive proposal essentially barring
searches and seizures of a newsman's "work product"" documentary mate-
rials. 2 In addition, while allowing for the continued use of subpoenas duces
tecum to secure these work product materials, the proposed legislation
creates a statutory preference for the employment of subpoenas duces
tecum to collect non-work product materials from newsmen. 3
Until the late 1960's, newsmen and prosecutors had maintained a
"negotiation and accommodation" posture with mutual respect for the
importance of each other's activities." The Supreme Court previously had
proscribed search warrants employed as prior restraints on the press 5 and
a compulsory disclosure of associational ties where such inquiry was not
germane to a criminal investigation."6 In addition, the Court had barred
Daily decision probably will encourage more states to enact shield laws. 3 SUFFOLK L. Rxv.
150, 159-60 (1979).
,0 Six bills in the 92d Congress and sixty-six bills in the 93d Congress were drafted in an
unsuccessfull attempt to legislate a federal newsman's privilege. Note, Reporter's Privi-
lege-Guardian of the People's Right to Know?, 11 NEw ENG. L. REv. 405, 415-16 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Reporter's Privilege]. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. explained that the failure
of the 93d Congress to write a newsman's privilege stemmed from a split among newsmen
concerning the type of privilege required and among legislators over the type of a privilege
which could obtain the requisite support to pass Congress. Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press
Privilege, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 233, 260-78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ervin].
" See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 75-109 infra. Although ridiculing the judicial reasoning
supporting Stanford Daily and other recent anti-press Supreme Court decisions, e.g., Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978),
newsmen generally are wary of "protective" legislation. A recent essay by Time magazine's
editor-in-chief set forth newsmen's thoughts:
No serious journalist questions the need to balance the rights of a free press against
other rights in society, including the rights of defendants. But the degree of balance
is what counts, and the balance is tilting against the press. As a result, a backlash
against the courts has begun in Congress, with the introduction of many bills
designed to shore up the rights of journalists. That is a mixed blessing. Spelling
out rights that were assumed to exist under the general protection of the First
Amendment may very well result in limiting those rights. Most of the press would
much rather not run to Congress for protection against the courts. Yet if the courts
continue on their present course, journalists will have little alternative.
Grunwald, Henry A., "Time Essay," Time (July 16, 1979) at 75. Thirteen other bills have
been proposed in Congress in response to Stanford Daily. See Comment, A Procedural Stan-
dard of Reasonableness for Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, 64 IowA L. REv. 367, 383-
84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A Procedural Standard of Reasonableness].
13 See text accompanying notes 93 & 94 infra.
" Ervin, supra note 10, at 242.
1" See, e.g., A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). This line of cases prohibits seizures directed at sup-
pressing circulation of news materials rather than collecting evidence.
"1 See, e.g., De Gregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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governmental conduct which had a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first
amendment rights. 7 During the 1960's, however, newsmen in the new situ-
ation of investigating anti-war demonstrations, the civil rights movement,
and the drug-oriented counterculture, often acted as the only trusted link
between those groups and the inquisitive public.' 8 As a result, prosecutors
increasingly relied on press subpoenas to uncover incriminating informa-
tion concerning confidential sources in these anti-establishment groups."
Not until 1972, however, did the Supreme Court directly consider whether
the protection afforded by the first amendment allowed newsmen to refuse
to testify before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena ad testificandum. 
2"
In Branz burg v. Hayes,2 the Supreme Court heard a trio of cases which
involved the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to reporters investigating
the Black Panther Party and illegal drug use.2 2 The newsmen, in claiming
a privilege not to testify, asserted that to gather news they necessarily often
must agree to withhold the source of information published or print only
a part of the facts revealed. Furthermore, the newsmen argued that if a
reporter is forced to disclose his confidential sources to a grand jury, his
confidential sources will be significantly deterred from offering publishable
information in the future. Consequently, the free flow of information pro-
tected by the first amendment would be abridged.23 In support of their
assertion, the newsmen relied on several cases which held that any in-
fringement of rights protected by the first amendment must be as limited
In these cases, the Supreme Court acted to protect associational privacy from governmental
action which was not strictly investigative.
'7 See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Although the questioned
action does not constitute a direct prohibition on the exercise of first amendment rights, these
cases indicate that the Supreme Court will restrict the action if the effect of the action would
result in the deterrence of first amendment activity.
18 Ervin, supra note 10, at 243-44. See generally Note, Newsperson's Privilege in Califor-
nia: The Controversy and Resolution, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 375, 376 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Newsperson's Privilege in California].
" Ervin, supra note 10, at 245.
20 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Although lower courts earlier had refused
the claim of an absolute newsman's privilege both at common law, see, e.g., Adams v.
Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), and under the first amendment, see, e.g.,
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), the Supreme Court
consistently declined to address the newsman's privilege issue until Branzburg. See Ervin,
supra note 10, at 241; Newsperson's Privilege in California, supra note 18, at 379; see, e.g.,
State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
21 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22 The Branzburg Court reviewed the petitions of three newsmen. Branzburg was subpoe-
naed after authoring a comprehensive survey of illicit drug activities in Frankfurt, Kentucky.
The survey revealed that Branzburg had witnessed the illegal use of marijuana during a two
week stay with drug-users. Id. at 667-68. A grand jury subpoenaed Pappas, a television
newsman, after he spent three hours inside a Black Panther Party headquarters awaiting a
police raid. Id. at 672-73. Caldwell was a newsman who also had established strong working
ties with the Black Panther Party. Id. at 675.
" Id. at 679-80.
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as possible while still allowing the government to achieve its necessary
purpose." This argument, however, was rejected by the Supreme Court,
which held that newsmen have no first amendment privilege to refuse to
answer relevant and material questions asked pursuant to a good faith
grand jury investigation.2 Since the "investigation of crime by the grand
jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety
of the person and property of the citizen," the Court concluded that a
grand jury investigation is of paramount interest.2 The Supreme Court
thus denied newsmen a testimonial privilege before grand juries and rea-
soned that if a newsman's sources of informaton are "as sensitive as they
are claimed to be," a conditional privilege would be of little benefit to a
newsman.2 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that every incidental
burdening of the press does not violate the first amendment.
2
8
Since Justice White's majority opinion in Branzburg received the sup-
port of only three other Court members, Justice Powell's short concurring
opinion attracted considerable attention. In the concurrence, Powell out-
lined a case-by-case balancing test to be employed between the freedom
of the press and the necessity of the newsman's testimony when a newsman
asserts that a grand jury investigation is being conducted in bad faith. 2'
24 Id. at 680-81; see, e.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
23 408 U.S. at 690, 708; see text accompanying note 30 infra. For an extensive list of
commentaries on Branzburg, see Reporter's Privilege, supra note 10, at 414 nn.47 & 48. Before
Branzburg, most courts relied on Judge (later Justice) Stewart's opinion in Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), a civil case which granted a
qualified newsman's privilege protecting against compelled disclosure of information not
going "to the heart of the plaintiff claim." Some courts, led by the Second Circuit's holding
in Baker v. F&F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1973),
have distinguished Branzburg on the basis of the civil-criminal distinction and followed
Garland. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976); Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26 (D. D.C.
1978); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd., v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976). But see Caldero
v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
28 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 700.
2 Id. at 702. The Supreme Court also noted the difficult burden the judiciary would
encounter in implementing a conditional privilege. Id. at 703-06. In distinguishing between
the value of enforcing different criminal laws in deciding whether to impose a newsman's
privilege, the Court decided that judges in essence would be making legislative decisions. Id.
at 705-06.
21 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682.
23 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). An investigation being conducted in bad faith could
be evidenced by a request for information which bears" only a remote and tenuous relation-
ship to the subject of the investigation" or is "without a legitimate need of law enforcement."
Id. In such a situation, the competing values of the free press and the societal interest in
prosecuting crime would be balanced by Powell on a motion to quash. See note 151 infra;
text accompanying notes 64-66 infra (Powell's explanatory concurrence in Stanford Daily).
As noted recently, "[T]he journalist may be required to testify in any and all good faith
criminal investigations - there is no case-by-case consideration given to a claim of privilege.
Good faith investigation interests always override a journalist's interest in protecting his
1979] 1181
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Several commentators and a few courts, searching for a way to limit the
impact of the denial of the newsman's privilege in Branzburg, contended
that Powell's pivotal concurrence interpreted the majority opinion to re-
quire a balancing test in all cases to determine a newsman's privilege20
Consequently, although Powell's concurrence was used to keep the issue
of a newsman's privilege alive in federal courts, the force of the newsmen's
arguments was greatly diminished."
Numerous state legislatures, in attempting a political solution in this
area, responded to Branzburg by enacting newsman shield laws.3 2 State
shield laws provide uncertain protection for transient newsmen, however,
because they are limited to the jurisdiction of the state, and only slightly
over half the states have enacted shield laws.3 Additionally, in federal
courts, state shield laws are binding only in civil proceedings in which state
law provides the rule of decision.3 In determining the question of privilege
in a federal question case, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 requires
only that federal courts interpret the principles of common law "in the
source. " Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030,
1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979) (emphasis in original); see In re
Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. 371, 641, 1503, 564 F.2d 567, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Conse-
quently, the court in United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem.,
559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) quashed a subpoena duces tecum
in a criminal action only after determining that, in addition to conflicting with the newsman's
first amendment interests, the grand jury sought materials irrelevant and immaterial to the
subject of the investigation. 424 F. Supp. at 232.
11 See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974);
Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26
HASTINGs L.J. 709, 741 (1975); Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 976 n.110.
See generally In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 299-300, 394 A.2d 330, 350 (1978) (Handler, J.,
dissenting). But see note 29 supra.
11 One commentator has noted that every case since Branzburg has recognized that the
rights of criminal defendants need to be balanced in some way against a newsman's first
amendment rights. Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 7, at 97.
32 See text accompanying note 9 supra. State shield laws typically protect a newsman
from compulsory testimony concerning a source of information. In addition, some shield laws
extend protection to the information itself. Almost half of the shield laws only afford newsmen
protection under a balancing test or deny it completely in libel cases. See Search and Seizure
of the Media, supra note 1, at 960-61. For an extensive analysis of state shield laws, see
Reporter's Privilege, supra note 10, at 427-57.
33 Newsperson's Privilege in California, supra note 18, at 404; see note 10 supra. In
Branzburg, New York and Massachusetts shield laws would have been inapplicable to Cald-
well, a New York Times reporter working in California, or Pappas, a Massachusetts television
newsman assigned to Providence, Rhode Island because of their limitation to the jurisdiction
of the newsman's state. See 408 U.S. at 672, 675.
11 FED. R. EvID. 501; see Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975). In
federal court, state shield laws apply only in federal diversity jurisdiction cases under the
doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Search and Seizure of the
Media, supra note 1, at 967. Consequently, federal courts situated in states with a shield law
may refuse a reporter's privilege in a non-diversity case.
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light of reason and experience."35 Although the chief draftsman of the
federal rules stated that the purpose of Rule 501 was to allow the develop-
ment of a newsman's privilege on a case-by-case basis,36 federal courts have
rejected the opportunity to create a newsman's privilege by limiting their
consideration to existing federal common law, which contains no such
privilege.37
The applicability of state shield laws to search and seizure of a news-
man's journalistic materials is uncertain.3 8 Assuming that the testimonial
shield laws are applicable to searches of a news office, the utility of such
laws to newsmen is minimal. Faced with a search warrant, the newsman
may either forcefully resist or relent and seek remedial litigation.5 In
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,40 police searched the office of the Stanford
University newspaper. The search was conducted pursuant to a search
warrant issued upon a finding of probable cause that the newspaper pos-
sessed photographs revealing the identities of demonstrators who had as-
saulted a policeman at the school hospital.' Although the search was com-
pleted without incident, the newspaper filed suit in federal court, alleging
that the materials sought should have been obtained through the use of a
subpoena duces tecum due to the first amendment interests involved.' 2
Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the Stanford Daily alleged that
the use of the more intrusive search warrant violated the first, fourth, and
fourteenth amendments.
4 3
The district court agreed with the newspaper, concluding that third
party searches 4 represent a dangerous threat to the ability of newsmen to
FED. R. EviD. 501.
120 CONG. REc. H12,254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
-1 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Newsper-
son's Privilege in California, supra note 18. By limiting their review to federal common law,
federal courts restrict any initiative in creating a newsman's privilege to the holding of
Branzburg. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
No court has directly applied a state shield law to a search of a press office. See Search
and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 961 n.28. Additionally, no authority exists suggest-
ing the applicability of these testimonial privileges to search and seizure. In In re Farber, 78
N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 331 (1978), the court concluded that Branzburg "squarely" applied to a
subpoena duces tecum, and further determined that New Jersey's shield law is restricted by
Branzburg. Id. at 340-41; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (1978) (News Media Privilege
Act).
31 Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 969; see 47 U. CINN. L. REV. 624,
631-32 (1978).
" 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affl'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
11 353 F. Supp. at 126. The police had no indication of and found no proof that any
member of the Stanford Daily newspaper was involved in the assault. Id.
' Id. at 127-28; see text accompanying notes 130-52 infra.
' 353 F. Supp. at 125-26. The Stanford Daily newspaper brought its action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id. at 125.
1, A third party search is one in which neither the owner of, nor anyone on, the premises
is suspected of criminal activity. See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 972;
note 49 infra.
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gather and disseminate information to the public.15 The court stressed that
when "less drastic means"46 exist to obtain the same information, a sub-
poena duces tecum should be required in all but rare circumstances. 7 In
support of its holding, the district court noted that search warrants histori-
cally involved only those persons implicated in criminal activity." Since
the protection of the exclusionary rule"6 is inapplicable to third parties,
15 353 F. Supp. at 136. The district court granted declaratory relief, but refused injunc-
tive relief because there was no indication that the police would conduct similar searches of
the newspaper office in the future. Id.
' The "less drastic means" doctrine, although predominantly applied in first amend-
ment cases, originated in cases interpreting the commerce clause. 86 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1322
n.30 (1973); see, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Under the less
drastic means doctrine as applied to the first amendment, the government must choose the
course of action which least interferes with the liberties guaranteed under the first amend-
ment when alternatives of equal effectiveness are available. Note, Less Drastic Means and
the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 464 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Less Drastic
Means]. The test has been termed illusory because the Supreme Court does not and cannot
competently weigh all of the available alternatives in terms of cost and effectiveness and, as
a result, limits its inquiry to traditional methods of resolution. See id. at 471-74; Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (unwanted leaflets delivered to home sufficiently
controlled by traditional homeowner's right to refuse strangers as visitors). Arguably, the
Court's reluctance to abide by the less drastic means test results from either a fear of formu-
lating advisory opinions, Less Drastic Means, supra, at 471, or a reluctance to engage in an
apparently legislative task. 86 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1973).
11 353 F. Supp. at 135. Under the district court's test, "rare circumstances" warranting
the use of a search warrant would exist when there is a "clear showing" that the destruction
or movement out of the jurisdiction of the court of important materials cannot be prevented
by a restraining order. Id. The district court's less drastic means argument was based upon
its finding that a subpoena duces tecum is "obviously" less intrusive than a search warrant.
See id. at 130. In support of this finding, the court evaluated the relative impact of the
alternatives on the news gathering activities of the press. Id. at 134. Search warrants, ex-
plained the court, allow police to rummage through the news office, rendering all confidential
materials vulnerable to disclosure. Id. at 134-35. Such an extensive operation disrupts the
activities of the news office, inhibiting the actual physical production of the newspaper. Id.
at 135. The ex parte issuance of a search warrant deprives a newsman of the judicial control
recognized as essential in Branzburg. Id.; see note 111 infra. The use of search warrants also
may jeopardize a newspaper's credibility and risk self-censorship. 353 F. Supp. at 135. In
contrast, the court determined that a subpoena duces tecum causes no intrusion into the
working offices of a newspaper and gives newsmen the opportunity to challenge its issuance
in court by filing a motion to quash. Id. at 130. In comparison to the district court's analysis,
see text accompanying notes 52-63 infra for the Supreme Court's reasoning in reversing.
353 F. Supp. at 131; see note 3 supra.
,' The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission into evidence of materials seized in
violation of the fourth amendment in federal and state criminal and "quasi-criminal" trials.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 165-68 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]. The district court argued that the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to
third parties, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), gives criminal suspects
more protection against unreasonable searches than innocent parties. 353 F. Supp. at 131. A
subpoena-first rule, submitted the court, would tend to adjust this balance through hearings
on a motion to quash which provide at least some comparable protection for a third party
newsman. Id. at 133; see note 139 infra.
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such persons are generally provided inadequate protection from unreason-
able searches." The Stanford Daily district court also accepted the plain-
tiff's assertion of support by analogy to a recent case holding that an arrest
warrant is improper unless there is probable cause to believe that a wit-
ness's presence cannot be secured by a subpoena ad testificandum.5 '
Although the district court's holding was accepted by both commenta-
tors and courts,5 2 the Supreme Court reversed, finding sufficient protection
for newsmen under the fourth amendment. Central to the Supreme
Court's reasoning was its conclusion that the identity of the person being
searched is largely irrelevant because the "critical element" in a search is
the reasonable belief that the specific thing searched for is on the property
to which entry is sought." In contrast to the newsmen's first amendment
argument that their confidential sources deserved protection from disclo-
sure, 5 the Court emphasized fourth amendment protections" in finding
that the use of a subpoena duces tecum offers no net gain in privacy over
the issuance of a search warrant.5 The Supreme Court determined that
353 F. Supp. at 131.
3, Id. at 132. The Stanford Daily newspaper relied on the holding of Bacon v. United
States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971), in which the court construed a factual situation
involving an arrest warrant issued for a material witness. 353 F. Supp. at 132; see FED. R.
CraM. P. 46(b) (compelled attendance of witnesses in criminal trials). At least one commenta-
tor has questioned the validity of the Stanford Daily district court's analogy, contending that
subpoenas issued for witnesses represent different considerations than those issued to produce
documents. See 86 HARv. L. REv. 1317, 1320-21 (1973).
52 See note 1 supra.
13 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978); see note 3 supra.
5, 436 U.S. at 556; see note 56 infra.
51 See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
16 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Stanford Daily relied on a fourth amendment
analysis, the case can be critiqued from a fourth amendment perspective. See Theory of
Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 1463 n.53. In Stanford Daily, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its faith in the cost-benefit theory of evaluating particular governmental actions, an analysis
which allows searches of innocent persons on the same probable cause required for the search
of a suspect. See id. at 1493. The Court noted that two of its previous decisions held that
even a less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable in cases where the search is
not being conducted to secure criminal evidence against the possessor. 436 U.S. at 556 (citing
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967)). As opposed to this approach, the less intrusive-means theory adopted by the Stanford
Daily district court affords innocent parties greater protection against searches than suspects.
See Theory of Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 1493; notes 47 & 49 supra. Because the search
involved first amendment interests, however, the Supreme Court determined that a more
stringent "particular exactitude" standard of probable cause is required for press searches.
See text accompanying notes 63 & 159 infra. The Supreme Court's decision thus can be read
as inviting a less intrusive means rationale when authorizing a search. See The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 52, 210 (1978).
1, 436 U.S. at 562-63. In determining that a subpoena provides no appreciable increase
in privacy protection over a search warrant, the Supreme Court noted that a subpoena does
not necessarily involve the judiciary and can issue absent a finding of probable cause. Id. The
Court concluded that if the probable cause requirement is satisfied, however, the nexus
between the materials sought and the criminal conduct being investigated probably will meet
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there need be no distinction between searches of third parties and suspects
because, through the requirement of probable cause, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public
need."58 In response to the newsmen's assertion that the inapplicability of
the exclusionary rule to third parties 9 warranted the granting of a news-
man's privilege,"0 the Court reasoned that barring otherwise reasonable
searches under this rationale "would be placing the cart before the
horse."'" The newsmen also failed to persuade the Court that a subpoena-
first rule would not undermine law enforcement efforts.2 In conclusion, the
Supreme Court found that the first amendment interests of newsmen are
adequately protected by the application of the fourth amendment search
warrant requirement of probable cause with "particular exactitude."'
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Stanford Daily, explaining that
his pivotal concurrence in Branzburg did not suggest any first amendment
exception to the fourth amendment," constituted a further setback to
newsmen. 5 Instead of identifying an implied procedural exception for
newsmen, Powell stated that his earlier opinion merely "approved recogni-
tion of First Amendment concerns within the applicable procedure."6
Powell interpreted the Stanford Daily majority opinion as directing magis-
the reasonableness standard necessary to justify a subpoena and defeat a motion to quash.
Id. at 567. Additionally, the Court determined that if prosecutors have a choice of which
alternative to pursue and select the more difficult to obtain search warrant, their selection is
probably based on the "solid belief" that the search warrant route is necessary to secure and
avoid destruction of the materials. Id. at 563. But see text accompanying notes 143-65 infra.
436 U.S. at 558.
5 See note 48 supra.
60 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
, 436 U.S. at 562-63 n.9.
62 Id. at 561. Third party searches may occur before the identity of the criminal is
ascertained, thereby creating the possibility that the third party is actually the criminal who
may destroy or dispose of incriminating evidence. Id. In addition, because the fifth amend-
ment privilege is not restricted to criminal suspects, the person served with a subpoena may
interpose the protection of this testimonial privilege. Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951)). See generally McCoRMicK, supra note 49, § 126. The Court noted that
an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege, even if frivolous, is difficult to overcome,
especially in the early stages of an investigation. 436 U.S. at 561.
436 U.S. at 565. The Stanford Daily Court found support for its "particular exacti-
tude" requirement for search warrants in the "scrupulous exactitude" standard formulated
in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). 436 U.S. at 564. Stanford v. Texas held that a
search warrant generally describing all "books, records, pamphlets,. . .concerning the Com-
munist Party of Texas . . ." was overbroad and thus unreasonable and thereby violated the
fourth amendment. The particular exactitude requirement limits the magistrate's discretion
in accepting less than strict compliance with the probable cause requirement. See text accom-
panying note 141 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
" See 436 U.S. at 570 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
6 Id. Justice Powell explained that his Branzburg concurrence "noted only that in con-
sidering a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a newsman, the court should balance the
competing values of a free press and the societal interest in detecting and prosecuting crime."
Id.
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trates to judge the reasonableness of the issuance of a search warrant "in
light of the circumstances of the particular case," thus allowing for recogni-
tion of independent first amendment concerns.67
Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, offered some consolation to news-
men with his determination that the majority overlooked the limited na-
ture of the Stanford Daily issue."8 Stewart suggested that the issue was not
whether the evidence sought was privileged from disclosure, but rather
whether any significant societal interest would be injured by creating a
judicial preference for subpoenas duces tecum. 6' Instead of completely bar-
ring the seizure of evidence from newsmen, the narrow question involved
only the adoption of an alternative procedure to gather such evidence.
Stewart argued that the Court, by misconstruing the issue, reached an
erroneous decision contradicted by a long line of judicial precedentl, re-
quiring a prior adversary hearing when first amendment liberties are
threatened.7' Justice Stevens, also writing in dissent, argued that because
present searches are no longer restricted to the fruits or instrumentalities
of a crime,7 2 the possibility that the possessor of documentary evidence
might not honor a subpoena duces tecum is remote. 73 Since the only justifi-
cation for an unannounced search of an innocent person is the fear that
he would conceal or destroy the materials sought, Stevens reasoned that
probable cause is not satisfied unless the warrant application demonstrates
a possibility of this occurrence.74
The Stanford Daily holding once again brought the issue of a news-
man's privilege to the forefront of American politics. 75 On April 2, 1979,
11 Id. at 570; see text accompanying notes 153-62 infra. Justice Powell's Stanford Daily
concurrence is distinguishable from his Branzburg concurrence in that the balancing proce-
dure Powell suggests in Stanford Daily is not contingent on an assertion of bad faith on the
part of the prosecutor by the newsman. Consequently, the balancing procedure conducted
pursuant to Justice Powell's Stanford Daily concurrence would be considered in the determi-
nation of reasonableness for all search warrants. Cf. text accompanying note 29 supra
(Branzburg concurrence).
11 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, in attempting to distinguish
Branzburg, asserted that the Stanford Daily Court need not be concerned with the general
principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." Id.; see Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. at 688. See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Ealy v.
Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978).
436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 575; see, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
71 436 U.S. at 575 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In contrast to the ex parte issuance of a search
warrant, a motion to quash provides a newsman with the opportunity to challenge a subpoena
in an adversary hearing. Id. at 576; see note 139 infra.
72 See note 3 supra.
436 U.S. at 577-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7' Id. at 582-83.
7' Justice Stewart has noted that the press is the only private business given explicit
constitutional protection. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975). The
protection given the press, however, goes to a prohibition on the making of a law which
infringes the activity, rather than the necessity of writing a law to insure protection. The
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President Carter's administration submitted major new legislation to Con-
gress in response to the recent Supreme Court case.7 6 The legislation is
directed towards the Administration's concern over the possibility of the
increased use of press searches, the anticipated damage to confidential
sources of newsmen and the potential for the physical disruption of press
operations.7 According to the Administration, the legislation, entitled the
First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979, is designed to protect a
newsman's information gathering activities while retaining the govern-
ment's authority to conduct essential searches necessary to maintain pub-
lic safety.78 Since the Act apparently is being enacted under Congress's
commerce power, 7 only those forms of public communication in or affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce will be covered by its provisions."
Constitution delegates to the government the prosecutorial tasks of society. Controversy
arises when the constitutional areas of protection overlap. Justice Stewart has observed:
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution. Con-
gress may provide a resolution, at least in some instances, through carefully drawn
legislation. For the rest, we must rely, as so often in our society we must, on the
tug and pull of the political forces in American society.
Id. at 636.
11 S. 855, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S3791 (daily ed. April 2, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as S. 855]. The bill was introduced by Senator Bayh and referred to the
Senate Committees on Governmental Affairs'and the Judiciary. 125 CONG. REc. 83790 (daily
ed. April 2, 1979).
11 Carter Administration Stanford Daily Announcement: Background Report, Office of
Media Liason, The White House Press Office, December 13, 1978, at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Background Report].
11 Id. at 1. President Nixon foreshadowed the outline of the proposed work product
doctrine for newsmen in a 1971 news conference:
Now, when you go, however, to the question of subpoenaing the notes of reporters,
when you go to the question of Government action which requires the revealing of
sources, then I take a very jaundiced view of that kind of action unless it is
strictly-and this would be a very narrow area-strictly in the area where there was
a major crime that had been committed and where the subpoenaing of the notes
had to do with information dealing directly with that crime . . . As far as the
subpoenaing of notes is concerned . . . I do not support that.
President's News Conference of May 1, 1971, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 703, 705 (1971),
reprinted in Ervin, supra note 10, at 254.
11 See S. 855, supra note 76, §§ 2(a) & 2(b) (both provisions are limited in applicability
to materials "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce"). Three possible constitutional
bases have been advanced in the past to support federal legislation concerning special protec-
tion for a newsman. See Newsperson's Privilege in California, supra note 18, at 408. Under
the commerce clause, Congress has the power to regulate action in or affecting interstate
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824);
note 80 infra. Assuming that the first amendment protection of the press is a "fundamental
liberty," legislation may be premised upon the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
Legislation also could be based on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment if the first amendment protection of the press was considered to be a privilege
or immunity. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg, supra
note 9, at 188.
"" The Supreme Court has consistently included all activities which even remotely affect
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interstate commerce within the reach of the commerce clause. Comment, Constitutional
Law-Commerce Power Limited to Preserve States' Role in the Federal System, 30 RUTGERS
L. REv. 152, 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Power Limited]; see, e.g., Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (commerce clause extended to regulation of consumption of
homegrown wheat altering national market prices). See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547 (1975). The breadth of the commerce power subjects even purely intrastate activities
which affect interstate commerce to congressional regulation. Note, Title VII And Public
Employers: Did Congress Exceed Its Powers?, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 372, 377 (1978). In reviewing
the constitutionality of congressional actions under the commerce clause, the Supreme Court
has contributed to the scope of the commerce power by requiring only the establishment of a
''rational basis for regarding them [federal statutes] as regulations of commerce among the
States." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968). The wide latitude afforded the com-
merce clause makes it improbable that any particular actor in the dissemination of news to
the public would not be involved in interstate commerce. Similarly, the unwarranted disclo-
sure of a newsman's confidential sources can be viewed as impeding the work of a newsman,
thus bringing press searches within the ambit of the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court enunciated the only real "limitation" imposed on Congress's com-
merce power in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Although acknowl-
edging the commerce power of Congress to impose minimum wage regulations on state em-
ployees, the Court held that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id. at 845. See generally Comment,
National League Of Cities: State Sovereignty As A Limitation On Federal Powers, 10
CREIGHTON L. REv. 488 (1977); Commerce Power Limited, supra. The National League of
Cities Court defined aspects of sovereignty which could not be impaired by federal interven-
tion as " 'functions essential to [a state's] separate and independent existence."' 426 U.S.
at 845 (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). In explanation, the Court
identified essential state functions as those "traditional operations" of state and local govern-
ments. Id. at 851 n.16. Major factors determining a traditional state governmental operation
are the importance of the affected state activity and whether the service is one which states
have historically afforded their citizens. Id. at 850; see Comment, Applying The Equal Pay
Act To State And Local Governments: The Effect Of National League Of Cities v. Usery,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 672-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Effect Of National League
Of Cities]. The Supreme Court identified police and fire protection as examples of traditional
state operations. 426 U.S. at 855. Importantly, however, the Court did not prohibit all federal
interference, but rather only that which "supplants," id. at 848, or operates to "directly
displace," id. at 852, the state's freedom to structure these integral operations. See Note,
Federal Securities Fraud Liability And Municipal Issuers: Implications Of National League
Of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1064, 1069 (1977). See generally City of Philadelphia
v. SEC, 434 F. Supp. 281, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(degree of compulsion upon state to comply
with federal dictate is a major factor in identifying supplanting federal interference). An
example of federal action which displaces state operations would be a federal directive order-
ing all searches to be conducted by federal officers. Consequently, although the Carter legisla-
tion purports to govern state officers exercising their police duties, a traditional state opera-
tion, the legislation would not directly displace state activity and thus seems unaffected by
the National League of Cities sovereign immunity exemption from the commerce clause
power.
In addition, the Supreme Court in National League of Cities did not foreclose the other
possible constitutional bases from which the Carter legislation could seek justification. See
note 79 supra. The Court expressly limited its holding to the commerce clause, stating "no
view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations
of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitu-
tion such as . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 426 U.S. at 852 n.17; see The Effect
Of National League Of Cities, supra, at 676-79; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
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Subject to limited exceptions,8 the first major provision of the proposed
legislation prohibits the use of search warrants, in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to obtain a newsman'S 2
"work product." 3 A newsman's work product is broadly defined to include
any documentary materials,84 excluding contraband or the fruits or instru-
mentalities of a crime, created by or for a newsman and in his possession
in connection with the planned dissemination of information to the pub-
lic. 15 Termed the "subpoena-only" rule, the provision generally would re-
quire the use of a subpoena duces tecum whenever the government sought
to obtain a newsman's work product. 8' Identified exceptions to the
subpoena-only rule would permit searches if the person possessing the
materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense for which
the evidence is sought,87 or if the immediate search and seizure is necessary
to prevent death or serious bodily injury.8  Government officers are specifi-
cally restricted, however, from employing a search warrant to seize materi-
als from a newsman if the offense for which the materials are sought con-
sists of the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of such
materials or the information contained within them.
The "subpoena-first" rule for non-work product documentary ma-
terials in the possession of a newsman constitutes the second major prong
of the legislation." Subject to broad exceptions, "' the subpoena-first rule
creates a legislative preference that the subpoena process be followed with-
out a search in the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.2 The
proposed legislation defines non-work product materials as documentary
452-53, 453 n.9 (1976)(apparently upholds 1972 Amendments to Title VII of Civil Rights Act
of 1964 based on § 5 of the fourteenth amendment).
" S. 855, supra note 76, § 2(a); see text accompanying notes 87 & 88 infra.
'' "Newsman" would generically refer to members of established newspapers, free-lance
writers, radio and television stations, magazines, academicians, and any other person possess-
ing "news" materials. Background Report, supra note 77, at 3-4; see S. 855, supra note 76,
§ 2(a).
11 See text accompanying note 84 infra. The legislation specifically includes notes, photo-
graphs, tapes, outtakes, videotapes, negatives, films, interview files, and drafts within "work
product," see S. 855, supra note 76, § 5(a) & (b), while excluding contraband or the fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime. Id. § 5(b).
See id. § 5(a).
Id. § 5(b). The materials included within a newsman's work product need not be
specifically prepared for publication, but need be prepared only in connection with plans to
publish. Id.
, See text accompanying note 85 supra.
S7 . 855, supra note 76, § 2(a)(1).
Id. § 2(a)(2).
" Id. § 2(a)(1). A search may be conducted, however, if the offense consists of the receipt,
possession, or communication of information relating to the national defense, classified infor-
mation, or restricted data under 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, 797, & 798 (1978) and 42 U.S.C. §§
2274 & 2275 (1978) and 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1978).
10 S. 855, supra note 76, § 2(b).
" See text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
,2 S. 855, supra note 76, § 2(b).
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items not created by or for the press,9 3 such as an extortion note or a bank
camera's film of a robbery.94 Exceptions to the subpoena-first rule include
all of the exceptions to the work product subpoena-only rule. 5 Additional
exceptions to the non-work product rule apply where giving notice pur-
suant to a subpoena duces tecum would result in the destruction, altera-
tion, or concealment of the materials. 6 A broad exception also exists where
all appellate remedies have been exhausted 7 and in a situation where a
delay in an investigation caused by the initiation of review proceedings
concerning the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum would threaten the
interests of justice."
Federal, state, and other governmental units99 are subject to both major
provisions of the proposed legislation. Any person aggrieved by a search in
violation of the Act can bring a civil suit to collect civil damages."", A
minimum of $1,000 of liquidated damages for actual injury could be
awarded to a successful complainant in addition to punitive damages,
reasonable attorney's fees, and other court costs.' The United States,' 2
any state which waived its eleventh amendment immunity,"" and any
other governmental body would be liable for violations of the proposed Act
by their employees.' In addition, these governmental institutions are re-
stricted from asserting as defenses the immunity of their employee or his
reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct, unless the
violation complained of is that of a judicial officer. "5 If a state has not
waived its sovereign immunity, the state officer or employee who violated
the Act while acting within the scope or under color of his employment is
liable for civil damages, but can assert a good faith compliance defense."
The damage action against governmental bodies under the Act is exclusive
of any other civil action in response to a violation of the Act. "'7 The United
'1 Materials subject to the subpoena-first rule are defined as "documentary materials,
other than work product." Id. § 2(b); see id. § 5(a).
" Background Report, supra note 77, at 3.
" S. 855 §§ 2(b)(1) & 2(b)(2); see text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
Id. § 2(b)(3).
'7 Id. § 2(b)(4)(A). All appellate remedies have been exhausted when a motion to quash
and subsequent appeals have been denied.
9 Id. § 2(b)(4)(B); see text accompanying note 139 infra.
" "Other governmental units" covered by the proposed legislation are the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any local govern-
ment, or any unit of state government. Id. § 5(c).
"I District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the news-
man's privilege. Id. § 4(f).
10 Id. § 4(d).
'2 Id. § 4(a)(1). A claim against the United States may be settled by the Attorney
General. Id. § 4(e).
'1 Id. § 4(a)(1); see U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
114 S. 855, supra note 76, § 4(a)(1).
' Id. § 4(b).
'o' Id. § 4(a)(2).
" Id. § 4(c). The legislation would not foreclose a civil damage suit against a searching
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States Attorney General is directed to promulgate regulations to provide
for and govern the commencement of an administrative inquiry following
a judicial finding of a breach of the proposed legislation."'0 Unspecified
administrative sanctions imposed against the officer or employee of the
United States may supplement the civil damage remedy.' 0'
Although constituting a new approach to the newsman's privilege prob-
lem, the employment of a work product doctrine to protect constitutional
rights by restricting good faith searches and seizures or disclosures is not
a totally novel concept."' Attorneys have enjoyed a similar privilege since
the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor,"' which restricted
discovery by opposing counsel." 2 Although the attorney work product doc-
trine protects from compelled disclosure materials prepared by an attorney
acting for a client in anticipation of litigation, the privilege has been lim-
ited to pre-trial discovery."' In a recent case, an attorney attempted to
invoke the work product doctrine at trial to prevent the admission into
evidence of an investigator's report prepared at the attorney's request.'
Although the Supreme Court found no need to discuss the scope of the
privilege due to a finding of waiver, "' Justice White, in a strong concurring
officer for wrongful acts other than a violation of the statute which occur in the same course
of events. 125 CONG. REC. S3793 (daily ed. April 2, 1979).
"I S. 855, supra note 76, § 4(e).
o Id.
"o Justice Stewart, dissenting in Branzburg, suggested a rule analogous to the proposed
legislation for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Stewart argued that the govern-
ment should be required to show probable cause that the newsman has information clearly
relevant to the criminal conduct being investigated, demonstrate that no less drastic means
exist, and prove a compelling and overriding interest in the information. 408 U.S. at 743
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see Substantive and Remedial Aspects, supra note 7, at 80 n.390
(notes similarity of Stewart's proposal to attorney work product doctrine).
"1 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
reversal of a lower court ruling which found an attorney in contempt of court for not answering
interrogatories from opposing counsel concerning the statements of four witnesses recorded
in preparation for trial. Id. at 514.
"I See generally Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1269
(1969); 58 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (1958). The Hickman work product doctrine is codified for civil
trials in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The doctrine is also applied to
criminal litigation. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236; FED. R. CriM. P. 16(b)(2).
The attorney work product doctrine is designed to protect the mental processes of an attorney
from discovery by opposing counsel and thereby enable the attorney adequately to prepare
to represent his client. In comparison, the newsman's privilege is focused on the protection
of confidential sources which comprise a significant factor in the free flow of information
through the press and ehable the newsman adequately to serve the public.
"1 329 U.S. at 508. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 49, § 96. The attorney work
product privilege is recognized as a qualified privilege because it may be waived. See United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239. Furthermore, the privilege can be overcome by a showing
that a denial of an attempted discovery would "unduly prejudice the preparation of peti-
tioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice." 329 U.S. at 509.
"' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236-40. See generally 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
391 (1976).
"' 422 U.S. at 236-40. The Nobles Court stated:
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opinion, denounced the wisdom of construing the majority opinion as im-
plicitly recognizing the work product doctrine as a trial privilege.'I" Tracing
the purpose of the privilege as protecting an attorney's work done in prepa-
ration for litigation from infringement, White firmly rejected any notion
that the doctrine through modern interpretation should be elevated to an
unprecedented role as a limitation on a judge's power to compel the pro-
duction of evidentiary materials at trial." 7 The overriding distinction is
that while a pre-trial discovery doctrine would only slightly injure the fact-
finding process, a rule which could keep evidence from the trier of fact
constitutes a serious impairment to a fair trial."8
Several profitable insights concerning the proposed newsman's privi-
lege can be deduced from a comparison of the proposed privilege with the
attorney work product doctrine."' Search warrants and subpoenas duces
tecum are similar to pre-trial discovery techniques used in civil proceed-
ings since both are essentially evidence gathering tools.2 0 An attorney's
Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work product doctrine do not disappear once
trial has begun. Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure
during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly development and presentation
of his case. We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of the
doctrine at trial, for in this instance it is clear that the defense waived such right
as may have existed to invoke its protections.
Id. at 239; cf. State v. Montague, 55 N.J. 387, 402, 262 A.2d 398, 405 (1970)("we may assume
that its [work product doctrine] underlying policy considerations will be honored at trial to
the extent that they are applicable"). But see text accompanying notes 116-18 infra. Since
Nobles, this dictum has remained dormant. Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that privileges in litigation are not favored. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct.
1635, 1648-49 (1979).
"l United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 243 (White, J., concurring)..
"7 Id. The attorney work product doctrine represented judicial recognition of the import-
ance of an attorney's work to the proper functioning of the adversary system. According to
Justice White, however, the Hickman Court purposely reasoned in such a way as to avoid
the evolution of the attorney work product doctrine into a privilege which could be asserted
at trial. Id. at 245. Instead of simply holding that the work product was "privileged," White
explained that the Hickman Court grounded its reasoning on the assertion that the discovery
rules were not designed for the discovery of an attorney's work product. Id.
M' Id. at 247-48.
M The legislative history of S. 855 specifically suggests a beneficial comparison with the
attorney work product doctrine stating:
The concept of "work product" as used in this statute is derived from and in many
ways analogous to the concept of attorney "work product." Thus it is intended that
the extensive body of case law concerning attorney "work product" is to be used to
aid in the determination of which materials constitute "work product" for the
purposes of this legislation.
125 CONG. REc. S3793 (daily ed. April 2, 1979).
12 Justice White in Nobles noted the similarity of a grand jury investigation to pre-trial
discovery. 422 U.S. at 247 n.6. A subpoena duces tecum, however, "cannot be used as a form
of discovery tool, or for a 'fishing' expedition." United States v. Moore, 423 F. Supp. 858,
860 (S.D. W.Va. 1976). While civil discovery techniques are employed to uncover possible
evidence, a search warrant and subpoena duces tecum serve primarily to collect evidence
which has been reasonably identified. See generally United States v. Hegwood, 562 F.2d 946,
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work product generally is exempt from discovery.' 2' Reflecting the basic
premise of the attorney work product doctrine, 22 a newsman's work prod-
uct materials are protected in the proposed legislation because these mate-
rials are integrally related to the ability of a newsman to adequately dis-
seminate information to the public, the essence of the newsman's func-
tion. 2 3 Like the attorney's privilege, the newsman's work product privilege
does not keep evidence from the trier of fact.2 4 A newsman remains subject
to a subpoena ad testificandum pursuant to the Branzburg decision.'
Instead of operating to infringe a fair trial,2 6 the newsman's work product
doctrine simply requires prosecutors to seize materials by use of a sub-
poena duces tecum from a newsman or rely on testimony under a subpoena
ad testificandum where a search warrant previously had been utilized.'2
Additionally, evidence obtained in contravention of the proposed news-
man's privilege would not be kept from the factfinder because of the in-
applicability of the exclusionary rule to the legislation.'2 The Supreme
Court's strict confinement of the attorney work product doctrine to pre-
trial discovery and the reasoning supporting the Branzburg holding seem
to negate any possibility of the newsman's privilege evolving into a trial
privilege. 2
Both prongs of the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979
favor the use of a subpoena duces tecum over reliance on a search war-
rant. '2 Since being first judicially articulated in the district court opinion
952 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079 (1978); United States v. Schembari, 484 F.2d
931, 936 (4th Cir. 1973).
121 See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
"2 See text accompanying note 117 supra; note 112 supra.
'2 Background Report, supra note 77, at 4.
121 See text accompanying note 118 supra.
'2 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
12 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
,2 See text accompanying note 175 supra.
,2 The exclusionary rule is limited to evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. See note 49 supra. See generally Note, The Extent Of The Exclusionary Rule, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 193 (1967). In contending that legislation or regulations should be promul-
gated to implement the ambiguous requirements of the fourth amendment, one commentator
suggests that a violation of such "constitutional rules" should make the search unreasonable
under the fourth amendment and the seized materials presumably subject to the exclusionary
rule. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 416-17.
'2' See text accompanying note 117 supra. Both the attorney and newsman's privileges
focus on pre-trial techniques of gathering evidence. See note 120 supra. Apparently unlike
the attorney work product doctrine, see text accompanying notes 113-18 supra, the purpose
behind the newsman's privilege of protecting confidential sources could be used to argue for
the creation of a trial privilege. See note 112 supra. The Branzburg reasoning, however,
rejecting a testimonial privilege for newsmen, would seem equally applicable to a documen-
tary privilege. See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.'
13 The first prong of the proposed legislation is generally termed a "subpoena-only" rule
for work product while the second major provision is generally referred to as a "subpoena-
first" rule.
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in Stanford Daily,'3 ' preference for a subpoena duces tecum has received
strong support.'32 Although the fourth amendment requires all intrusions
into personal privacy to be reasonable, '3 a different standard of proof must
be met to establish the propriety of issuing a search warrant as opposed to
a subpoena duces tecum.'34 Moreover, different procedures must be fol-
lowed for their issuance. A search warrant can be issued in an ex parte
proceeding upon a finding by a magistrate that there is "probable cause"
to believe that there are materials on the premises relevant to criminal
conduct being investigated and that the intrusion into privacy would be
reasonable.13s In contrast, a grand jury, or a judge after an adversarial
hearing if a motion to quash is filed, issues a subpoena duces tecum. '" A
subpoena duces tecum is issued upon a general showing of
"reasonableness."' 37
"' 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
122 See, e.g., Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 972-73; 86 HARV. L. Rv.
1317, 1329 (1973). See generally Substantive and Remedial Aspects, supra note 7, at 141.
" See note 3 supra.
IU The Supreme Court held in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73-76 (1906), that requests
for documents by a subpoena duces tecum had to meet the requirement of reasonableness
under the fourth amendment. See note 3 supra. Search warrants are specifically covered by
the fourth amendment. See id. The fourth amendment's overall reasonableness standard has
been interpreted as a "substantive" limitation on invasions of personal privacy. See
McCoRMcK, supra note 49, § 170. In contrast, probable cause is identified as merely a
"procedural" limitation on the issuance of a search warrant. Id. Consequently, while all
invasions of personal privacy must be reasonable, a search warrant also is governed by the
procedural prerequisite of probable cause.
'" See MCCORMcK, supra note 49, § 171; Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note
1, at 986. As defined by the Supreme Court, probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within their [the officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable cau-
tion in the belief" that an offense has or is being committed, or that identified materials
connected to a crime are located at a particular place at a particular time. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1958) and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)
(both citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)); see United States v. Lefkow-
itz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 231 (C.D. Cal. 1979); MCCORMICK, supra note 49, § 170 at 377. See also
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964)(probable cause identical for arrest and search
warrants).
"I' See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 979-85.
137 The most widely cited guidelines to determine the reasonableness of a subpoena duces
tecum state: "(1) the subpoena may command only the production of things relevant to the
investigation being pursued; (2) specification of things to be produced must be made with
reasonable particularity; and (3) production of records covering only a reasonable period of
time may be required." United States v. Gurule, 437 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1970); see In re
Rabbinical Seminary, 450 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. N.Y. 1978). A balancing of the competing
interests in a particular situation colors the specific application of these standards. See
generally text accompanying notes 143-52 infra. For one court's interpretation of the
"relevance" standard required, see text accompanying note 146 infra. The "particularity"
standard required is met by.a showing of
first, particularity of description so that a person attempting to exercise a subpoena
may in good faith know what he is being asked to produce; and second, particularity
of breadth so that a person in complying with a subpoena in good faith is not
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Finding a subpoena duces tecum preferable to a search warrant, news-
man supporters of a statutory preference for a subpoena duces tecum em-
phasize both the reasonableness standard governing the subpoena's issu-
ance and the availability of an adversary hearing on the merits. Although
an improper search of an innocent third party is not within the ambit of
the exclusionary rule, 3 ' an unreasonable subpoena duces tecum can be
avoided by means of a motion to quash.'39 In the process, the standard of
reasonableness which has to be met to obtain a subpoena duces tecum can
be sharpened through adversarial argument. " " A search warrant's probable
cause requirement, however, is normally satisfied simply by a magistrate's
ex parte review of affidavits."' Furthermore, newsmen have decried the
disruptive effect of an unexpected search on the activities of a busy news-
room and the possible disclosure of confidential sources other than those
integrally associated with the criminal conduct being investigated which
could be alleviated by the use of a subpoena duces tecum. '2
Inherent in the reasonableness standard adopted to govern the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum4 3 is a flexibility which permits the adjustment
of the requirement to reflect the particular circumstances of the situation.
harassed or oppressed to the point that he experiences an unreasonable business
detriment.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 367 F. Supp. 1126, 1132 (D. Del. 1973). A
"reasonable period of time" has been defined to require some relation to the subject of the
investigation, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575, 578 (S.D. N.Y.
1961), and generally including documents accumulated within the past ten years. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 342 F. Supp. 709, 713 (D. Md. 1972). Judge Friendly has
suggested that the modern lenient trend in judging the reasonableness of a subpoena duces
tecum is not to analyze the description in fourth amendment terms, but rather in the less
rigid review mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In re Horow-
itz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
' See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 987-88; note 49 supra.
' ' A motion to quash gives newsmen the opportunity to appear in an adversarial hearing,
affording newsmen what has been termed first amendment "due process." See generally
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 H~Av. L. REv. 518 (1970). First amendment
due process requires that a judge determine, with the assistance of adversarial arguments,
whether a challenged governmental procedure improperly infringes on interests guaranteed
by the first amendment before or as soon after the initiation of the governmental action as
possible. See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 988 n.184. The Supreme Court
has required first amendment due process where the substantive law in the case involves the
first amendment. See, e.g., Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). However, when police
investigatory procedures infringe on first amendment values where the criminal activity does
not integrally involve first amendment safeguards, such as in Stanford Daily, courts usually
do not afford those involved first amendment due process. Search and Seizure of the Media,
supra note 1, at 988 n.184.
"' See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 981-82.
"' See id. But see note 57 supra (contrary analysis of Supreme Court in Stanford Daily).
See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 49, § 170.
"I See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 989 nn.188 & 189, 990 n.198;
note 47 supra.
11 See note 134 supra.
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In most situations, the reasonableness standard is more easily satisfied
than the probable cause counterpart in search warrant issuance. As one
court has explained, "[V]ery little need be shown to justify a grand jury's
demand for materials and that very little must suffice if the grand jury is
to function." " Relevance is a major factor in determining reasonable-
ness,45 but an acceptable showing of relevance may include merely an
identification of the "generic nature" of the subject matter of the criminal.
investigation and the establishment of "some possible relationship" of the
materials to the investigation.'48 Broad descriptions are necessary in a
subpoena duces tecum because the identity of the criminal and the precise
nature of the criminal offense are usually not ascertained until the conclu-
sion of a grand jury proceeding.'47 Although the government must make a
prima facie showing of relevance,4 8 compliance with the relevance stan-
dard is presumed by courts absent a motion to quash the subpoena.' A
presumption of regularity attaches to a grand jury subpoena"' and the
heavy burden of proving unreasonableness thus falls on the petitioner.''
"I In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 143 N.J. Super. 526, 535, 363 A.2d 936,
940 (1976).
145 See note 137 supra. Relevance in the ordinary evidentiary sense is not required be-
cause grand juries do not know beforehand what they seek to establish. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between the evidence sought and that which has not been established cannot possi-
bly be stated. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956). Consequently, relevancy in the context of a grand jury subpoena is
measured by a less exacting standard. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 459 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
,"In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. R.I. 1975).
"' Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism And Constitution-
ally Protected Privacy Under The Fourth And Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 979
n.212 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Formalism]; 86 HARv. L. REv. 1317, 1324-25 (1973); note
137 supra.
"I In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. R.I. 1975). The
Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), as-
serted that the government must make a "preliminary showing by affidavit" that each item
sought is relevant to a grand jury investigation. Id. at 93. Although Schofield could be
interpreted as requiring a relevancy hearing before the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum,
the majority of courts have rejected this possibility. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation,
425 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Fla. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 418 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
In re Morgan, 377 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
"I In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. R.I. 1975).
110 In re Lopreato, 511 F.2d 1150, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975).
,51 Id.; see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. at 994-95. The burden
of going forward and showing prima facie unreasonableness falls on the party served with the
subpoena, while the issuing party carries the burden of persuasion. See In re Liberatore, 574
F.2d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1978). To quash a subpoena duces tecum, the petitioner must prove
that the description of items in the subpoena is "too sweeping in its terms" to be reasonable.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973). A subpoena duces tecum also can be quashed
if the petitioner can establish that the power of the subpoena was directed toward accomplish-
ing an improper objective. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir.
1972). For comparable restrictions on the issuance of a search warrant, see text accompanying
notes 15-17 supra.
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When first amendment interests are affected, however, courts require the
government to prove that the subject matter of the investigation is
"immediate, substantial, and subordinating" and that it depict a
"substantial connection" between the grand jury investigation and the
subpoenaed materials.'5 2 Newsmen thus have maintained that a sub-
poena's flexible reasonableness standard is stricter in first amendment
cases than the probable cause required to issue a search warrant.
The Supreme Court, however, also has recognized some flexibility in
the probable cause standard applicable to the issuance of a search war-
rant.' 53 This flexibility inures from the incorporation of the term
" 'unreasonable,' the key word permeating this whole [Fourth] Amend-
ment,' 5  into the determination of probable cause. In the context of area
inspection searches, the Court relied on the fourth amendment's ultimate
reasonableness requirement to temper the standard of probable cause since
the protection afforded by the normal stricter probable cause standard was
deemed unnecessary. 5 As the Supreme Court noted in reviewing the issu-
ance requirements of area inspection searches, "[R]easonableness is still
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant."' 5 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its recognition
of flexibility in probable cause determination in civil cases by emphasizing
the overall reasonableness requirement in formulating a more easily satis-
fied probable cause standard to govern the issuance of administrative
search warrants. 57 Incorporation of the reasonableness standard, however,
is not "a one-way street to be used only to wateri down probable cause when
necessary.""'5 The Stanford Daily Court's announcement of a "particular
'12 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-66 (1975); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d
1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). See also In re
Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"I See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). See generally Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); In re Establish-
ment Inspection, 589 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1979)(following Camara and See); Note,
Constitutional Law-Administrative Searches-Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: OSHA Needs A
Warrant, 57 N.C. L. REV. 320 (1979).
"I Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967)(Black, J., dissenting). The Berger Court
reviewed the reasonableness of a wiretapping in a criminal conspiracy case. Id. at 45.
"I Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39 (1967). See also United States v.
Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972)(quarantine inspection).
,5' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 538-39.
,5 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). See generally United States
v. Roux Lab., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 973, 967-77 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Marshall v. Weyerhauser Co.,
456 F. Supp. 474, 483 (D. N.J. 1978). Defining probable cause for administrative searches in
Barlow's, the Supreme Court stated, "Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not re-
quired .... [Instead, an acceptable standard would necessitate only a] showing that
'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . .inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'" 436 U.S. at 320.
'" Id., cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1972) ("A seizure reasonable as to one
type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to
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exactitude" probable cause standard to govern press searches is an exam-
ple of a stricter judicial refinement of the standard in a criminal case
because of the first amendment interests involved." Justice Powell's
Stanford Daily concurrence reflects this interpretation of the majority
opinion. 10 Although the Court has been reluctant to identify the flexibility
of probable cause in criminal cases,161 no reason exists to prevent the con-
tinued formulation of increasingly higher standards of probable cause,
grounded upon reasonableness considerations, to justify increasingly intru-
sive criminal searches.
6 2
Although the fourth amendment itself sets forth two evidentiary stan-
dards to govern governmental invasions of personal privacy,6 3 reasonable-
ness and probable cause, the Supreme Court, in implementing these stan-
dards, focuses on the additional flexibility provided by the standards
themselves. Both search warrants and subpoenas duces tecum are issued
under procedural standards firmly rooted in the substantive reasonable-
ness standard of the fourth amendment.'64 With a subpoena duces tecum,
however, newsmen are given the opportunity to present adversarial argu-
ments by filing a motion to quash. 6 5 In the process, newsmen can mold a
slightly more favorable procedural standard for a subpoena duces tecum.
Consequently, the substitution of a subpoena duces tecum for a search
warrant under the proposed legislation would give newsmen a minor bene-
fit in this respect.
The Supreme Court's Stanford Daily holding66 is couched in fourth
amendment analysis,' and the newsman's privilege is thus aptly termed
a response to the Stanford Daily decision.' Although addressing first
amendment concerns, the newsman's work product doctrine can be viewed
another kind of material"); United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir.
1977)("stricter evaluation of reasonableness" necessary where prior restraint of'right of ex-
pression). See generally, A Procedural Standard of Reasonableness, supra note 12, at 380-82.
', See text accompanying note 63 supra.
28 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
"' Flexibility has permeated probable cause in the context of a seizure and search of a
person. See MCCORMICK, supra note 49, § 173; see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State in Interest of H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d
759 (1977).
1'2 See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(al-
luded particularly to the nighttime search of a private home). See generally State v. Slock-
bower, 79 N.J. 1, 397 A.2d 1050 (1979)("when confronted with purposes, objects or circum-
stances not envisioned by the framers, the wiser, and indeed the proper course is to apply
the reasonableness clause.").
28 The two standards have been described as adding to the fourth amendment "the
flexibility essential to realistic accommodation of essential law enforcement investigatory
techniques." McCoam~cK, supra note 49,§ 170.
6I See note 134 supra.
285 See note 139 supra.
28 436 U.S. 547 (1978); see text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
87 See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
28 Background Report, supra note 77, at 1.
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as a solution totally within the traditional parameters of the fourth amend-
ment. 11 The proposed legislation seeks to establish only the preference of
one fourth amendment procedure over another. 70 Absent a break from the
fundamentals of the fourth amendment, the search and seizure of materi-
als in the possession-of third parties which endanger newsmen's confiden-
tial sources would be governed by the normal reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis which defines the scope of the fourth amendment. 7' Since
the proposed legislation restricts only a search and seizure of materials in
a newsman's possession, protection would not be afforded to other third
party searches which may disclose a newsman's confidential sources. "2
Consequently, a recent decision refusing to recognize a newsman's first
amendment claim to extend the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
to a subpoena duces tecum issued to a telephone company for his toll-call
records would have been unchanged by the proposed Act. 73 An extension
of the newsman's privilege to materials not in his possession would require
direct reliance on an emphasis of first amendment interests over fourth
amendment dictates, which the current proposal specifically averts.'
74
The First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979 constitutes only
a more formalized restatement of the Stanford Daily district court's hold-
"' In United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court specifically identi-
fied the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), see note 3
supra, as relying on a similar least intrusive means rationale. 553 F.2d at 157.
170 See text accompanying notes 81-98 supra.
'7' See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)(no expectation of privacy in checks
voluntarily conveyed to bank).
"I See Background Report, supra note 77, at 5; text accompanying notes 84 & 89 supra.
,7' See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979).
"', Background Report, supra note 77, at 5. The Carter Administration refrained from
extending the newsman's privilege to other third party searches because of the "numerous
complexities that [the Administration] believe[s] require further study." Id. Specific prob-
lems cited include the possible encouragement to criminal suspects to conceal evidence in
the sanctuaries of third parties, selecting which relationships deserve special protection, and
sorting the constitutional problems concerning state and local searches. Id.
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a trend toward defining fourth and
fifth amendment protections against improper searches and seizures by focusing on the act
compelled by a search warrant or subpoena duces tecum. See Formalism, supra note 147, at
946; see, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976). The central issue now is whether the act of producing papers is incriminating
because it may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, ac-
knowledgement of the existence of specified documents, and a concession of control by the
possessor over the documents. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at 473-74. Previous fourth
amendment Supreme Court decisions, descendants of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), centered inquiry on a consideration of the type of materials sought. See Formalism,
supra note 147, at 946. The Supreme Court's Stanford Daily holding seems to comport with
this modern emphasis by shifting away from an analysis of any protected first amendment
interests in the materials themselves. See text accompanying note 63 supra. Consequently,
an extension of the newsman's privilege to materials in the possession of third parties by the
Supreme Court simply because the materials are related to first amendment interests is
improbable.
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ing which called for the implementation of the less drastic means ap-
proach' 5 in obtaining evidence from a newsman. 7 Significantly, neither
major provision of the legislation purports to establish,'" nor does the
Supreme Court seem inclined to permit,78 a privilege which could be as-
serted at trial. The development of a work product doctrine for newsmen
including sufficient protection for non-work product materials constitutes
a logical resolution of conflicting interests that minimizes the potential
infringement on the right to a fair trial without completely abandoning the
protection arguably afforded the press by the first amendment. Benefiting
newsmen most under the proposed legislation is the added protection con-
fidential sources would receive which are not integrally related to the cur-
rent investigation.'7 9 Because of the availability of an adversarial hearing
after a motion is filed to quash a subpoena duces tecum, newsmen can
challenge the legitimacy of the need for the materials before relinquishing
control and participate in the application of the reasonableness standard
to the particular circumstances of the case, thus molding a more favorable
standard than a search warrant's probable cause counterpart. Newsmen
thus would be given added protection from being compelled to produce
unnecessarily documentary materials.'80 In addition, newsmen would no
longer have to tolerate the physical disruption of their newsroom activi-
ties.'8 ' Newsmen, although still not having secured a true "privilege" to
protect the disclosure of their confidential sources,'82 should recognize and
support the proposed Act as a step forward in the campaign to prevent the
gradual erosion by the Supreme Court of their first amendment interests
and ability to competently serve the public.
ALAN A. SANT'ANGELO
',' See note 46 supra.
'' See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
17 See text accompanying notes 81-98 supra.
,,8 See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
'1 Thorough searches of a newsroom, implemented by reading every file and document
until the information sought is located, subject all of a newsman's confidential sources to
possible disclosure. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' See text accompanying notes 143-65 supra.
' See note 47 supra. An all day search recently was undertaken of the San Diego Street
Journal office. See Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 1, at 957 n.3. In another
instance of the physical disruption of a news office by a police search, radio station KPFK-
PM's operations were interrupted for eight hours as police sought a "communique" from the
New World Liberation Front which took credit for a bombing. Id. at 957-58. See generally
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"8 See text accompanying notes 175-76 supra.
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